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INTRODUCTION
In the first 17 years of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
considerable criticism has surfaced about the ADA's real effects on sus-
tained employment for persons with disabilities. Many contend that the
ADA is a near-complete loss to plaintiffs whose lack of success in ADA
t A.B. Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Af-
fairs, 2004; J.D. Cornell Law School, 2007.
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employment discrimination litigation parallels the abysmal plaintiff suc-
cess rates in prisoner rights cases.1 It is argued that defendants win 93%
of all ADA employment discrimination cases at the trial level.2 The Su-
preme Court has reinforced the perception of the ADA as a failure by
increasingly narrowing its interpretation of the definition of disability. 3
In the 2002 decision Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams (hereinaf-
ter Toyota Manufacturing), the Court further narrowed the definition of
disability to consider those activities that substantially limit a person in
his or her daily life, and thereby prohibited exclusive consideration of a
person's limitation at work.4 This interpretation considerably reduced the
scope of disabilities covered by the ADA.5
In an attempt to understand the relative success or failure of the
ADA, this paper compares ADA employment discrimination case dispo-
sitions to race, sex, and age employment discrimination case dispositions
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and in the Northern District of
Georgia. This analysis includes dispositions in the Northern District of
Georgia, which includes Atlanta, and the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, which includes Philadelphia, in the six month period of case
terminations before and the six month period of case filings after the
decision in Toyota Manufacturing. This study demonstrates that ADA
dispositions fare comparably to race, sex, and age employment discrimi-
nation dispositions. Differences in case dispositions appear to depend on
the district court studied, not on the type of claim filed (whether race,
sex, age, or disability discrimination claims). Finally, the Supreme
Court's narrowing definition of disability has not affected ADA out-
comes in post-Toyota Manufacturing case dispositions.
Despite edicts in legal journals 6 and the media 7 proclaiming the
ADA's inadequacy and the Supreme Court narrowing of the definition of
"disability," the relative success of the ADA is unsettled. 8 Quantitative
1 See e.g., Eliza Kaiser. The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Unfulfilled Promise for
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, 6 U. PA J. LAB. & EMP. L., 735, 738 (2004).
2 Id. (citing Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defend-
ants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999)).
3 See Sutton v. United Airlines 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (restricting definition of visually
disabled to include only people who remain visually impaired after employing a "mitigating
measure" such as glasses or contacts); Murphy v. United Airlines 527 U.S. 516 (1999)(ex-
tending "mitigating measure" restriction to determination of "substantial limitation" evaluation
in the context of medication for hypertension); Albertson's v. Kirkingburg 527 U.S. 516
(1999) (extending "mitigating measure" restriction to cover conscious or subconscious meth-
ods one's own body uses to compensate for visual impairment).
4 See Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002).
5 See id.
6 See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note 1.
7 See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act. An Unfulfilled Promise for
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, 6 U. PA J. LAB. & EMP. L., 735,738 (2004).
8 See Toyota Manufacturing, 534 U.S. at 184.
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analysis of ADA trial court outcomes is sparse. One study, by Ruth
Colker, analyzed ADA trial dispositions collected by the American Bar
Association (ABA). Colker reported that of the 615 cases collected, 570
were resolved in the defendant-employer's favor.9 She claimed that of
the 570, nearly 238 were disposed of on summary judgment grounds and
the remainder were "resolved through a decision on the merits."'10 How-
ever, she does not acknowledge that the vague category "decision on the
merits," accounting for 332 (54%) of the total dispositions, quite proba-
bly consisted of some pro-plaintiff settlements and instead claimed that
the "defendant-employer prevailed in 570 cases (92.7%).""1
In addition to neglecting the pro-plaintiff role that settlement out-
comes may serve, scholars tend to assess the ADA in a vacuum. For
example, Colker's data does not provide useful information without a
base of comparison. Her claim that defendants win 93% of all ADA em-
ployment discrimination cases 12 presents information without context.
While it may be true that in some district courts most employers win
most cases that proceed to trial, 13 the vast majority of employment dis-
crimination cases end in pre-litigation Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) mediated resolutions, voluntary dismissals, or set-
tlement before trial.14 The percentage of filed claims that reach the final
stage of litigation is often very small and therefore does not represent the
vast majority of employment discrimination cases. 15 ADA litigation is
comparable to litigation in other areas of employment discrimination
where the bulk of charges filed with the EEOC and other cases filed
never reach the final stages of litigation. Thus, a comparison of different
categories of employment discrimination cases yields a more telling pic-
ture of the ADA's relative success than reporting the overall success
rates of ADA plaintiffs with cases that proceed to trial.
9 Colker, supra note 7, at 109. Colker used ABA data to avoid under-representing cases
where no judicial opinion is published upon disposition, a bias inherent in studies that use
databases such as Westlaw that primarily include data from published opinions.
lO Id. at 109.
11 Id.
12 See Kaiser, supra note 1, at 197.
13 However, whether the figure is as high as 93% is challenged in the Table 5 series
below.
14 See Table 5.3, infra, where 97.5% of of race, sex, disability, and age discrimination
cases in federal court were disposed of in some form other than a jury verdict or bench
decision.
15 See Table 5.3, infra, where 97.5% of race, sex, disability, and age discrimination cases
were disposed of in some form other than a jury verdict or bench decision. Consideration of
the additional administrative remedies the EEOC often provides in cases that never reach trial
court reveals that the percentage of jury verdict or bench decision outcomes is not the most
representative measure of how employment discrimination cases fare.
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This note compares ADA employment discrimination trial court dis-
positions to race' 6 (Title VII), sex (Title VII), and age (Age Discrimina-
tion Employment Act (ADEA)) employment discrimination trial court
dispositions. These four categories of employment discrimination con-
stitute the majority of charges considered by the EEOC.' 7
I. BACKGROUND
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) became law in 1990.18
Its provisions apply to employment, state accommodations, public ac-
commodations, and telecommunications. 19 Title I of the ADA addresses
employment 20 : "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. '21 Title I prohibits dis-
crimination in employment practices by private employers, state and lo-
cal governments, employment agencies, and labor unions for employers
with 15 or more employees.22 The Justice Department has the authority
to enforce the ADA23, but like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, plaintiffs are
encouraged to bring their claims forward independently. 24 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) operates as a first point
of settlement determination for all Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims. 25
Plaintiffs must usually file their charges with the EEOC within 180 days
of the occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory event.26 If a state or
local agency exists and participates in the pursuit of employment dis-
crimination charges, plaintiffs must file the charge with the agency
within 60 days of the allegedly discriminatory event and must file with
16 Under race employment discrimination dispositions, I also counted § 1981 filed as 442
employment discrimination causes of action in federal court.
17 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges FY 1992-2005, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2006) (ADA, Race, Sex, and Age claims accounted for more than 85% of all
employment discrimination charges) (hereinafter EEOC, ADA Charges).
18 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A "covered entity" includes an "employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or joint labor management committee." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
22 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
24 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In addition to discrimination
claims based on race, sex, age and disability, the EEOC also enforces the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII provisions relating to discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
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the EEOC within 300 days. 27 If the EEOC is unable to resolve the issue
(a result known as "unsuccessful conciliation"), the claim is not with-
drawn, and there is not a settlement, then the plaintiff can request a "right
to sue" letter to pursue their claim in federal court. 28
Although the EEOC does not offer detailed settlement information,
its data indicate that, of the ADA charges filed in 2006, approximately
12% of ADA charges resulted in settlements, 23.4% resulted in "merit
resolutions," in favor of the filing plaintiff.29 In addition to merit resolu-
tions, 5.6% of the claims between 1992 and 2006 were deemed "reasona-
ble cause," however the EEOC was only able to successfully resolve
2.2%, leaving 3.5% deemed to have "reasonable cause," but unresolved
by the EEOC where a pre-litigation settlement was not reached. 30 Of the
remaining cases, approximately 16.3% were closed administratively, 3'
and 60.3% were dismissed by the EEOC as being without "reasonable
cause."' 32 When a charge is determined to be without reasonable cause,
the EEOC does not participate in its settlement but gives plaintiffs a
"right to sue" letter, enabling them to take their claim to federal civil
court.
3 3
The majority of claims that reach federal court are not claims that
the EEOC has deemed meritorious. In addition to 12% settlements,
18.6% "merit resolutions," the EEOC is only able to resolve about forty
percent of the 5.6% of ADA discrimination charges that it deems merito-
rious. 34 The majority of the ADA employment discrimination claims
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). To determine the percentage of "right to sue" letters issued
one subtracts the sum of successful conciliations, withdrawals, and settlements from the total
number of charges. Therefore, from 1992 to 2004, on average 85% of all ADA charges could
in theory receive "right to sue" letters. See EEOC, ADA Charges, supra note 17.
29 See EEOC, ADA Charges, supra note 17.
30 Id.
31 Id.; see also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Definition of Terms,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/define.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006)(defining administrative clo-
sure as a response to one of the following events: "failure to locate charging party, charging
party failed to respond to EEOC communications, charging party refused to accept full relief,
closed due to the outcome of related litigation which establishes a precedent that makes further
processing of the charge futile, charging party requests withdrawal of a charge without receiv-
ing benefits or having resolved the issue, no statutory jurisdiction.") (hereinafter EEOC, Defi-
nition of Terms).
32 See EEOC ADA Charges, supra note 17; EEOC, Definition of Terms, supra note 31.
33 There is some dispute regarding how easy it is for plaintiffs to receive a "right to sue"
letter. The ADEA provides routes to bypass the full EEOC review process and allows suits in
a more direct fashion.
34 EEOC ADA Charges, supra note 17 the EEOC deemed 6.3% of all cases to have
reasonable cause, but was only able to administer a successful conciliation in 2.2% of all cases.
2.2%/5.6% or 338/867 = 39%.
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that reach federal court have been determined as lacking in merit by the
EEOC.35
When ADA charges are compared to other charges, such as discrim-
ination on the basis of race, sex, and age, the EEOC outcomes are simi-
lar. Of the sex discrimination charges filed in 2006, 12.1% of these
claims resulted in a settlement favorable to the charging party, 24.7%
resulted in merit resolutions in favor of the filing plaintiff.36 Approxi-
mately, 6.3% were deemed to have reasonable cause, but only 1.9% of
all charges were successfully reconciled, leaving 4.4% deemed to have
reasonable cause but where a pre-litigation settlement was not reached. 37
Of the remaining cases, approximately 18.9% closed administratively 38
and 56.5% were dismissed by the EEOC as being having "no reasonable
cause."'39 Similarly, of the race-based charges filed in 2006, only 11.7%
of these claims resulted in a settlement favorable to the charging party,
and 17.6% resulted in merit resolutions, in favor of the filing plaintiff.40
Approximately 20% resulted in a "merit resolution," an additional 3.9%
were deemed to have reasonable cause, but only 1.1% of all charges that
were also deemed to have reasonable cause resulted in a successful con-
ciliation. The remaining 2.8% of charges deemed to have "reasonable
cause" were unresolved by the EEOC and a pre-litigation settlement was
not reached.4 1 Of the remaining cases, approximately 13.2% closed ad-
ministratively and 66.7% were dismissed by the EEOC as being without
cause.
42
Finally, of the age-based charges filed in 2006, 10% of ADEA
charges resulted in a settlement favorable to the charging party, and ap-
proximately 19.8% resulted in merit resolutions in favor of the filing
plaintiff.43 An additional 4.3% were deemed to have reasonable cause,
but only 1.3% of charges also deemed to have reasonable cause resulted
in a successful EEOC conciliation, the remaining 3.1% of charges
deemed to have reasonable cause were unresolved by the EEOC and a
35 See EEOC ADA Charges, supra note 17.
36 See U.S Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sex-Based Charges FY 1992-
2005, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/sex.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006) (hereinafter EEOC Sex-
Based Charges.
37 Id.
38 Id.; see EEOC ADA Charges, supra note 17; see also EEOC, Definition of Terms,
supra note 30..
39 See EEOC Sex-Based Charges, supra note 36; EEOC, Definition of Terms, supra note
31.
40 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Race-Based Charges FY 1992
- FY 2005, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/race.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
41 See id.
42 See id.; see also EEOC, Definition of Terms, supra note 31.
43 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA) Charges, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2006).
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pre-litigation settlement was not reached.44 Of the remaining cases, ap-
proximately 18.7% closed administratively and 61.8% were dismissed by
the EEOC as being without cause.4 5
Although the data may seem to indicate that race-based charges fare
worse than other types of charges in EEOC processing, EEOC outcomes
are quite similar for disability, sex, race and age. The notion that the
strongest cases are often resolved by the EEOC, or at the very least la-
beled as merit claims by the EEOC, may help explain why employment
discrimination cases fare as they do in federal court: many of the strong-
est claims are settled early on in the EEOC process, leaving the weaker
cases to be litigated in federal civil court.
II. CRITICISM OF THE ADA
Legal and media analyses of Title I of the ADA is uniformly criti-
cal. The media portrays the ADA as a tool for opportunistic plaintiffs
with weak disability claims.46 Legal scholarship tends to view the ADA
as a failure for plaintiffs, demonstrated through windfall victories for de-
fendants who win over 90 percent of all trial level ADA employment
discrimination claims, but this figure is rarely given context.4 7 Other
publications allege that, "thirteen years on [after passage of the ADA],
many fear that Title I of the ADA ultimately may fail the worker (or the
aspiring worker) with disabilities. '4 8
Although the statistics vary by a few percentage points,
the consensus of academics, the American Bar Associa-
tion, and practitioners for both employers and employ-
ees, is that employers prevail in over 90 percent of ADA
Title I cases at the trial court level and in 84 percent at
the appellate level.49
In addition to studying the ADA and employment outcomes in a
broad manner that gives sufficient context for analysis, it also makes
sense for legal scholars to assess the relative success of ADA claims by
comparing ADA employment discrimination trial dispositions to other
employment discrimination claims. Where employment discrimination
suits are known to settle or be otherwise disposed of before reaching a
44 Id.
45 Id.; see also EEOC, Definition of Terms, supra note 31.
46 Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO
ST. L. J. 239, 240 (2001).
47 See Kaiser, supra note 1 at 736; see also Louis S. Rulli & Jason A. Lekerman, Unfin-
ished Business: The Fading Promise of ADA Enforcement in the Federal Courts Under Title I
and its Impact on the Poor, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 595, 597 (2005).
48 Rulli & Leckerman, supra note 47, at 596.
49 See Kaiser, supra note 1, at 736.
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jury verdict or bench decision, it makes sense to study the dispositions of
trial outcomes to understand how the ADA fares compared to other em-
ployment discrimination claims.
In contrast to academic reactions to the ADA, the media has por-
trayed the ADA as, "a lifelong buffet of perks, special breaks and proce-
dural protections." 50 Some have attributed much of the media reaction to
the landmark 1998 Supreme Court decision Bragdon v. Abbott, where the
Court held that the ADA covered an asymptomatic HIV-infected dental
patient. 51 It was feared that the ADA was being too loosely interpreted
and that nearly anyone could establish themselves as having a disabil-
ity. 52 To some extent, the media's reluctance to embrace the ADA may
stem from deep-seated prejudices about the working abilities of people
with disabilities. Disability law scholar Peter Blanck notes, "Conscious
attitudinal biases about the abilities of people with disabilities have been
amplified in media portrayals of persons with hidden impairments, such
as stories suggesting that persons with histories of psychiatric impair-
ments are prone toward violence or inappropriate behavior in the
workplace. 53
The media's reaction to the ADA is in part explained by the largely
stereotyped view that only certain disabilities constitute legitimate disa-
bilities.54 But the view that the only people benefiting from the ADA are
recovering drug addicts and people with hidden, less socially accepted
disabilities is false.55 The EEOC classifies disability charges by placing
the alleged disability into one of 42 categories. 56 Below is a table of the
ten most alleged categories of disability discrimination and the frequency
of these charges.
50 See Ruth Colker, supra note 7, at 99 (citing journalist Ruth Shalit for the New
Republic).
51 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
52 See Colker, supra note 7, at 99.
53 Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior, and the Employ-
ment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VRL. L. REV. 345, 350 (1997).
54 Id.
55 This is not to sanction the social stigma attached to disabilities that lack visibility and/
or acceptance, only to mention that the perception of who is benefiting is not necessarily a
reflection of who is actually benefiting.
56 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, ADA Charge Data by Impair-
ments/Bases-Receipts, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-receipts.html (Last visited Mar. 25,
2007).
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Table A: Top Ten EEOC Categories of Disability Charges57
Percentage out of all EEOC
disability discrimination
Rank Disability Category of Alleged Discrimination Charge charges
I Other Disabilities 19.8%
2 Orthopedic and Structural Impairments of the Back 12.8%
3 Non-paralytic Orthopedic Impairment 8.7%
4 Depression 6.7%
5 Diabetes 4.1%
6 Record of Disability 3.9%
7 Heart/Cardiovascular 3.8%
8 Other Psychological Disorders 3%
8 Hearing 3%
8 Other Neurological Impairments 3%
The above listed categories of disability charges represent a wide
array of disabling conditions that do not represent the handful of condi-
tions stereotypically associated with the word "disability. ' 58 The failure
of disability charges to conform to a stereotyped view of disability is
hardly a worthy reproach of the statute. While fear of opening the ADA
to abuse may have some merit, the root of the problem, as Peter Blanck
mentions above, may be the hesitancy of critical sources to look beyond
stereotypical conceptions of what constitutes a disability. The notion
that back pain, or less visible disabilities such as depression are not as
debilitating as other disabilities, persists. Part of this may stem from the
fundamental difference between disability and race, age, and sex;
whereas generally an individual's sex, race, or age is only subject to a
relatively limited number of possibilities, and is relatively obvious to the
casual observer, there exists a vast range of disabilities that the able-
bodied public simply does not know about. This view may change as
disability awareness increases..
This discussion should consider the criteria the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA) uses to determine whether a person is disabled.
SSA's assessment looks to functional capacity and the ability to engage
in the essential physical and mental obligations of the workplace. These
functional restrictions are often determined by abilities to carry given
amounts of weight, undertake particular movements, or the cognitive
ability to follow directions and communicate effectively in the work-
place.59 These limitations are correlated to some of the categories indi-
57 Id.
58 It is worth mentioning that the EEOC's method of categorizing disability charges is
limiting. While it is true that there are a vast number of disabilities, where 20% of charges are
being categorized as "other" there may be some legitimate concern as to what exactly these
other disabilities entail.
59 Code of Federal Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (Residual Functional Capacity).
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cated in the table above, such as non-paralytic orthopedic impairment,
orthopedic structural impairments of the back, and depression.
60
Beyond the view that the ADA fails to encouragc the establishment
of legitimate and less stereotyped disability definitions, the ADA's short
period of existence may be a factor. Like the civil rights laws that came
before the ADA, it takes time and extended advocacy efforts before soci-
ety at large can undergo a shift in stereotypes and establish new notions
of acceptability.
III. HIGHER COURTS AND THE ADA
In her 2001 study, Ruth Colker compared ADA appellate judicial
outcomes to appellate outcomes of similar civil rights statutes, including
Title VII. 61 Colker reviewed 720 appellate cases filed after January of
2000 and found that ADA cases resulted in pro-defendant reversals in
60% of cases and pro-plaintiff reversals in only 21% of cases. 62 In con-
trast, of the Title VII claims filed during the same period, 34% received
pro-plaintiff reversals and 41% resulted in pro-defendant reversals.
63
Colker notes that although Title VII claims appear to fare better in appel-
late courts than ADA claims, Title VII claims are not as successful as
they were in the mid-1960s after Title VII was implemented. 64 It is
worth noting both that Colker examined appellate decisions available on
Westlaw, which does not publish all unpublished decisions, and that
Colker's sample size of ADA and Title VII cases was rather small.
65
Colker concedes that to fully understand how ADA litigation com-
pares to litigation of other employment discrimination causes of action
one must review settlement, verdict, and trial court data.66 Nevertheless,
her data is statistically significant and it reveals that courts of appeals are
not receptive to the ADA. Colker's findings also indicate that a plaintiff
who filed Title VII appeals along with ADA appeals tended to fare the
same as if they had filed only an ADA appeal. This can be interpreted in
one of two ways: that judges' dislike of the ADA taints their view of a
party's other claims, or that individuals who file multiple claims are less
likely to have multiple strong claims. The latter interpretation seems to
make more sense, as strategically plaintiffs may feel tempted to plead
multiple bases of discrimination in one transaction.
60 See supra Table A.
61 See Colker, supra note 46, at 240-46.
62 Id at 253.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 253-354, 259-260.
65 Id. at 253-54 (indicating that the sample size of Title VII claims was 129 during the
year assessed, not a particularly large sample size, especially considering the absence of many
unpublished decisions).
66 Id. at 242.
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Colker's assessment demonstrates higher courts' apprehension of
the ADA, and although limited to court of appeals decisions, as Colker
mentions, it is often court of appeals decisions that legal scholars and the
media analyze. Colker's data, if taken at face value, brings forth ques-
tions about whether lower courts have responded to higher courts' seem-
ing dislike of the ADA by giving less favorable dispositions to ADA
plaintiffs than to other plaintiffs with different causes of action.
This idea is furthered by recent Supreme Court decisions restricting
the scope of the ADA. After Bragdon v. Abbott, the 1998 Supreme
Court decision mentioned above, the Court took a sharp turn in its defini-
tion of disability. Beginning in 1999, three decisions, Sutton v. United
Air Lines,67 Murphy v. United Parcel Service,68 and Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg,6 9 resulted in heavy burdens for plaintiffs to establish ADA
claims. In Sutton v. United Airlines the court held that if a person uses
mitigating measures to reduce the effects of a disability, use of those
measures must be considered in determining whether the person is dis-
abled. 70 In Sutton this meant that when United Airlines refused to hire
pilots whose vision failed to meet the company standard, the pilots could
not be considered disabled because, the effects of mitigating measures,
both positive and negative, should be considered when determining
whether an individual meets the definition of disability. 7 1
In 2002, the Supreme Court's decision in Toyota Motor Manufac-
turing v. Williams narrowed the definition of disability. In Toyota Manu-
facturing the Court interpreted the term "major" in "major life activities"
to mean activities central to daily living. The Court held that in order for
a manual task to be considered a "major life activity," it must be an
activity central to daily life, such as walking, seeing and hearing. If the
impairment only prevents a person's ability to do a particular job and
does not affect a major daily life activity as well, the individual is not
disabled. 72 In Toyota Manufacturing the plaintiff had uncontested medi-
cal evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome, but was not determined to be
disabled because the manual tasks she was restricted in doing at work
were not tasks that she would have to undertake in her daily living activi-
ties. Therefore, carpal tunnel syndrome did not represent a disability in
her daily living activities. 73
The trend among higher courts demonstrates a narrowing of the def-
inition of disability, making it difficult for plaintiffs to legally establish
67 Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
68 Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
69 Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
70 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83.
71 Id. at 482.
72 See Toyota Motor Manufactunng v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
73 Toyota Manufacturing, 534 U.S. at 201-203.
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the existence of a disability. Furthermore, through Colker's study it ap-
pears that when ADA cases are appealed they tend to result in pro-defen-
dant outcomes. The question remains how, if at all, the representation of
higher court ADA dispositions has affected ADA dispositions in trial
courts.
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY
This paper analyzes 1,01074 employment discrimination cases by
reviewing docket sheets categorized as employment discrimination cases.
These cases are available through the Public Access to Court Electronic
Records (PACER), an electronic public access service that allows users
to obtain case and docket information from United States federal appel-
late, district and bankruptcy courts, and from the U.S. Party/Case Index.
I reviewed cases in the Northern District of Georgia and in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. I selected the Northern District of Georgia be-
cause it is home to a major southern U.S. city, Atlanta, and it has exper-
ienced a significant amount of employment growth for a number of
years. 75 I selected the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because it is
home to a major northern U.S. city, Philadelphia, it has a substantial
population base, 76 and since 2001 it has had positive employment
growth. 77 On practical grounds, the Northern District of Georgia and the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania provided sufficient descriptive informa-
tion regarding types of employment discrimination alleged and the dispo-
sition of the cases. Furthermore, in both districts PACER labeled causes
of action as early as the mid-1990s, making it possible for me to access
cases filed in the .mid-1990s that did not terminate for seven or eight
years.
I initially wanted to determine whether the narrowing definition of
disability in Toyota Manufacturing had an effect on the disposition of
ADA outcomes. I compared ADA dispositions during the pre-Toyota
74 Of the sample size of 1,010, only 886 applied to Race, Age, Disability, and Sex Dis-
crimination causes of action; I did not consider FMLA, ERISA, or National Origin or Religion
Title VII causes of action.
75 See The Top 25 Cities for Doing Business in America, INC. MAGAZINE, Mar. 2004,
http://www.inc.com/magazine/20040301/top25.html. Atlanta is ranked first overall and noted
for its economic diversity, growth rate and affordability. Growth rate is significant in employ-
ment discrimination assessments because often economies with slow growth are less likely to
have comprehensive representation of employment discrimination.
76 U.S. Census states the 2005 population of the city of Philadelphia as 1,463,281, www.
census.gov (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
77 THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, REGIONAL HIGHLIGHTS 2 (4th Qtr.
2004), http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/reghigh/rh0404a.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2005). I
would have preferred to use data from New York and Houston as both cities consist of larger
relative northern and southern populations, but the docket sheets in both districts inconsistently
indicated the type of employment discrimination alleged.
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and post-Toyota period to race, sex, and age dispositions. I analyzed all
race (Title VII), sex (Title VII), age (ADEA) and disability (ADA) cases
that terminated in each district in the six month period prior to Toyota
(July 8, 2001-January 7, 2002) to all the cases filed in the six month
period after Toyota (January 8, 2002-July 7, 2002). This included a large
range of cases with some pre-Toyota filing dates as early as 1994 and
some post-Toyota cases terminating in 2005. This is, therefore, an asym-
metrical assessment. I chose to look at terminations in the pre-Toyota
category and filings in the post-Toyota category because employment
discrimination cases typically take from one to three years to complete,
making it difficult to take a sample of filings even one to two years
before Toyota. Additionally, as will be further discussed below, from
1998 to 2002 the ADA was increasingly construed narrowly, making it
even more difficult to select a period sufficiently far from the Toyota
decision to ensure that cases would be terminated before the decision
while also selecting a period that would accurately gauge the pre-Toyota
climate.
I did not include all docket sheets that were brought forth through
my PACER search; where the docket sheets labeled as employment dis-
crimination lacked a categorical employment discrimination cause of ac-
tion, were duplicates, personal injury cases, or were misplaced prisoner
rights and workers' compensation cases, I did not include them.7 8 My
analysis only includes race, sex, age and disability claims, at the exclu-
sion of Title VII National Origin and Religion claims, Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA), Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
claims.
In analyzing these cases, I paid particular attention to the disposition
details, who the disposition favored, and the procedural details of the
disposition. I then categorized each disposition into one of eight catego-
ries, detailed below in Table 1. I compared details of disposition to
causes of action in order to determine the rates of summary judgment,
likely settlement, non-summary judgment dismissal, dismissals without
prejudice, and bench decisions of race, sex, age, and disability employ-
ment discrimination cases. I also compared pre-Toyota employment dis-
crimination cases to post-Toyota cases to determine if there had been a
measurable reduction in plaintiff success rates after Toyota
Manufacturing.
78 1 also did not include about 20 FMLA and ERISA cases out of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. All of these cases were settled, but as I was particularly interested in comparison
to race, sex, age, and disability, I did not include them.
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A. METHODOLOGY
I analyzed each docket sheet in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
and in the Northern District of Georgia to determine the type of employ-
ment discrimination alleged. I also recorded information about the plain-
tiff, defendant, case number, whether the plaintiff proceeded pro se,
which party requested a jury trial, the disposition of the case, the proce-
dural details of the disposition, who the disposition favored, whether the
case was appealed and how it fared on appeal. I categorized dispositions
on docket sheet into one of the eight categories below. The procedural
details of dispositions were similar in both districts, with the exception of
the rampant use of the local rule 41.1(b) for settlements in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.
Table 179: Categories of Employment Discrimination Disposition
Code Title Entailing
I Summary 56(b) (all summary judgments assessed were pro-defendant)
Judgment
2 Likely 41(a)(1), 41(a)(l)(i), 41(a)(1)(ii) (dismissed by stipulation with prejudice,
Settlement 8 °  joint stipulation), consent decree, dismissed or administratively closed
(where "disposition" indicates settlement), Local Rule 41. 1(b) (used in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, this indicates settlement on docket
sheets).
3 Procedural default, failure to pay filing fee, 4(m) (failure to serve), failure to
Default exhaust administrative remedy, local rules, lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) (fraud in alleging forna pauperis)
4 Non- 12(c) (motion to dismiss), 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which
Summary relief can be granted) with prejudice, 50 (judgment as a matter of law),
Judgment 37(d) (failure to participate in discovery), failure to prosecute with
Dismissal prejudice, failure to comply with court order with prejudice
Pre-Trial with
prejudice
5 Jury Verdict Jury verdict
6 Miscellaneous death of plaintiff, transfer of venue, joint motion to transfer, unclear,
administratively closed, bankruptcy, mediation, undetermined
7 41(a)(1)(i) Voluntary dismissal by plaintiff without prejudice, any disposition
without without prejudice other than procedural default
prejudice
8 Bench Verdict Bench verdict
V. FINDINGS
Notable findings include the consistency of employment discrimina-
tion dispositions among the categories of race, sex, disability, and age
within a given district court. Perhaps most noteworthy were the differing
rates of pro-defendant summary judgment and settlement when compar-
79 Original data for all tables are available upon request.
80 The label "likely settlement" marks the upper-limit of claims that were likely settled.
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ing cases filed in the Northern District of Georgia with cases filed in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Of all the race, sex, disability, and age employment discrimination
dispositions analyzed in the Northern District of Georgia and in the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, 17.5% resulted in pro-defendant summary
judgment dispositions, 57.2% were likely settled, 4.9% were dismissed
with prejudice on non-summary judgment grounds (pro-defendant), 2.3%
resulted in jury verdicts (46% pro-plaintiff and 54% pro-defendant), 8'
and .23% resulted in bench decisions (all pro-defendant). 82 As is demon-
strated below, these outcomes were relatively consistent when comparing
disability dispositions to race, sex, and age employment discrimination
dispositions.
Table 2.0: Comparing ADA to Race, Sex (Title VII) and Age
(ADEA) Discrimination in the Northern District of Georgia and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Non SJ
Likely Dismissed Dismissed
Summary Settle- Procedural with Jury without
Judgment ment Default prejudice Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
Race, Sex 137 434 52 40 15 48 39 2 767
and Age 17.8% 56.5% 6.7% 5.2% 1.9% 6.3% 5.1% .26% 100%
ADA 18 73 6 3 5 7 7 0 119
15.1% 61.3% 5% 2.5% 4.2% 5.9% 5.9% 0% 100%
All 155 507 58 43 20 55 46 2 886
17.5% 57.2% 6.5% 4.9% 2.3% 6.2% 5.2% .23% 100%
Table 2.1: Comparing ADA to Race, Sex (Title VII) and Age
(ADEA) Discrimination in the Northern District of Georgia and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the Merits
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Race, Sex 137 434 40 15 2 628
and Age 21.8% 69.1% 6.4% 2.4% .32% 100%
ADA 18 73 3 5 0 99
18% 73.7% 3% 5.1% 0% 100%
All 155 507 43 20 2 727
21.3% 69.7% 5.9% 2.8% .28% 100%
When accounting only for disposition of all cases on the merits
(cases not dismissed for procedural defects or unexplained reasons), ap-
proximately 21.3% resulted in summary judgment (pro-defendant),
81 See infra Table 2.0; infra Table 5.1.
82 See infra Table 2.0. Although I looked at 1,010 cases, only 886 consisted of race, sex,
disability, or age employment discrimination cases.
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69.7% were likely settled, 5.9% resulted in non-summary judgment (pro-
defendant) dispositions, 2.8% resulted in jury verdicts, and .28% in
bench decisions.8 3 Even in the extreme situation where all jury verdicts
and bench decisions are pro-defendant, the data in these two jurisdictions
demonstrate that 69.7% of the remaining cases would likely settle.84 Set-
tlement dispositions may be considered at least in large part pro-plaintiff,
as settlement often represents some acceptance of fault by the defendant.
Also noteworthy is the similarity between ADA employment dis-
crimination cases and race, sex, and age employment discrimination
cases. Where cases not decided on the merits are also considered, ADA
dispositions resulted in summary judgment in 15.1% of dispositions and
were likely settled 61.3% of the time. 85 When considered only on the
merits, ADA employment discrimination cases appear to result in
slightly fewer summary judgment dispositions (18% compared to 21.8%
for race, sex, and age) and are slightly more likely to settle (73.7% com-
pared to 69.1% for race, sex, and age). 86
A. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DISTRICT COURTS
Table 3: Comparing ADA to Race, Sex (Title VII) and Age
(ADEA) Discrimination in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Likely
Summary Settle-
Judgment ment
23 220
7.6% 72.9%
6 48
9.2% 73.8%
29 268
7.9% 73%
Dismissed
Procedural Non SJ Jury without
Default Dismissed Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
4
1.3%
2
3.1%
6
1.6%
302
100%
65
100%
367
100%
83 See supra Table 2.1.
84 See supra Table 2.1
85 See supra Table 2.0.
86 See supra Table 2.0.
Race, Sex
and Age
ADA
All
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Table 3.1: Comparing ADA to Race, Sex (Title VII) and Age
(ADEA) Discrimination in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Dispositions on the Merits
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Race, Sex 23 220 11 10 1 265
and Age 8.5% 81.8% 4.1% 4.4% .37% 100%
ADA 6 48 0 3 0 57
10.5% 84.2% 0% 5.3% 0% 100%
All 29 268 11 13 1 322
8.9% 83.2% 3.4% 4% .31% 100%
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, dispositions lean heavily
towards settlement. When compared to all dispositions, ADA settle-
ments accounted for 73.8% of all ADA dispositions, compared to 72.9%
of all dispositions for race, sex and age. 87 ADA dispositions resulting in
summary judgment accounted for 9.2% of ADA dispositions compared
to 7.6% summary judgment outcomes for race, sex, and age88. When
assessed only on the merits 84.2% of all ADA dispositions resulted in
settlement, compared to 81.8% for race, sex, and age, whereas the re-
maining 15.8% of ADA cases and 18.2% of race, sex, and age cases
were disposed of either through summary judgment or through other pro-
defendant dispositions such as motions to dismiss, jury verdicts, or bench
decisions.89
Table 4: Comparing ADA to Race, Sex (Title VII) and Age
(ADEA) Discrimination in the Northern District of Georgia
Likely Dismissed
Summary Settle- Procedural Non SJ Jury without
Judgment ment Default Dismissed Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
Race, Sex 114 214 48 29 5 27 27 1 465
and Age 24.5% 46% 10.3% 6.2% 1.1% 5.8% 5.8% .22% 100%
ADA 12 25 4 3 2 4 4 0 54
22% 46.3% 7.4% 5.6% 3.7% 7.4% 7.4% 0% 100%
All 126 239 52 32 7 31 31 1 519
24.3% 46% 10% 6.2% 1.3% 6% 6% .19% 100%
87 See supra Table 3.
88 See supra Table 3.
89 See supra Table 3.1.
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Table 4.1: Comparing ADA to Race, Sex (Title VII) and Age
(ADEA) Discrimination in the Northern District of Georgia
Decided on the Merits
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Race, Sex 114 214 29 5 1 363
and Age 31.4% 59% 8% 1.4% .28% 100%
ADA 12 25 3 2 0 42
28.6% 59.5% 7.1% 4.8% 0% 100%
All 126 239 32 7 1 405
31.1% 59% 7.9% 1.7% .25% 100%
In contrast to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern
District of Georgia has more pro-defendant summary judgment disposi-
tions. ADA settlements accounted for only 46.3% of all ADA disposi-
tions, compared to 46% of all dispositions for race, sex and age.90 ADA
dispositions resulting in summary judgment accounted for 22% com-
pared to 24.5% summary judgment outcomes for race, sex, and age.9'
When assessed on the merits, 59.5% of all ADA dispositions resulted in
settlement, compared to 59% for race, sex, and age.92
When assessed on the merits, 28.6% of ADA dispositions resulted
in summary judgment and 31.4% of race, sex, and age dispositions re-
sulted in summary judgment. 93 Thus, nearly 40.5% of ADA cases and
41% of race, sex, and age cases were disposed of through summary judg-
ment or other typically pro-defendant dispositions such as motions to
dismiss, jury verdicts, or bench decisions. 94
This accounts for a stark difference in the likelihood of a pro-plain-
tiff95 outcome depending on the district court. When race, sex, age and
disability cases on the merits are assessed together this means that in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 83.2% of all race, sex, age, and disabil-
ity cases are likely to settle compared to only 59% in the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia.96 For all other dispositions on the merits, with the
exception of the occasional jury verdict or bench decision that is pro-
plaintiff, only 16.8% of cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
90 See supra Table 4.
91 See supra Table 4.
92 See supra Table 4.1.
93 See supra Table 4.1.
94 See supra Table 4.1 (Subtracted likely settlement dispositions from all other disposi-
tions on the merits).
95 If one considers settlement to be at least partially pro-plaintiff.
96 See supra Table 3.1; supra Table 4.1.
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were pro-defendant compared to 41% in the Northern District of
Georgia. 97
B. CONSISTENCY AMONG CATEGORIES OF DISCRIMINATION WITHIN
EACH DISTRICT COURT
Although part of the original goal was to measure differences in
filings and outcomes in the periods before and after Toyota Manufactur-
ing (decided on January 8, 2002), I found nothing statistically significant
in this assessment. However, by separating each employment discrimi-
nation claim into a before and after period, I found a general consistency
among the dispositions over time and across groups, but as demonstrated
above, not across district court. The general consistency of dispositions
across the protected categories is particularly significant when one con-
siders the large span of time these cases covered. All of the cases cate-
gorized as "pre" Toyota Manufacturing ended by January 7, 2002, but
were filed between 1999 and 2001. All of the cases categorized as "post"
Toyota Manufacturing were filed as early as January 8, 2002 and many
ended as late as 2005, with a few still in process at the time I collected
the data. This seems to demonstrate that despite the lack of symmetry in
the "pre" and "post" cases reviewed, courts of a particular district tend to
treat employment discrimination cases similarly, with the major variation
attributable to the location of district court.
1. ADA Disability Dispositions in the E.D. of Pennsylvania and
the N.D. of Georgia
Table 3.2: Dispositions of ADA Filings in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania Pre/Post Toyota Manufacturing
Likely Dismissed
Summary Settle- Procedural Non SJ Jury without
Judgment ment Default Dismissed Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
Pre- 1 26 2 0 2 1 2 0 34
Toyota 2.9% 76.5% 5.9% 0% 5.9% 2.9% 5.9% 0% 100%
Post- 5 22 0 0 1 2 1 0 31
Toyota 16.1% 71% 0% 0% 3.2% 6.5% 3.2% 0% 100%
Total 6 48 2 0 3 3 3 0 65
9.2% 73.8% 3.1% 0% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 0% 100%
97 See supra Table 3. 1; supra Table 4.1. To arrive at these figures, subtract likely settle-
ment dispositions from all other dispositions on the merits.
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Table 3.3: Dispositions on the Merits of ADA Filings in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Pre/Post Toyota Manufacturing
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Pre- 1 26 0 2 0 29
Toyota 3.4% 89.7% 0% 6.9% 0% 100%
Post- 5 22 0 1 0 28
Toyota 17.9% 78.6% 0% 3.6% 0% 100%
Total 6 48 0 3 0 57
10.5% 84.2% 0% 5.3% 0% 100%
As demonstrated above in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, disability cases in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in the periods before and after Toyota
Manufacturing demonstrated substantial difference in rates of summary
judgment and settlement. Pre-Toyota Manufacturing disability cases had
summary judgment dispositions only 2.9% of the time, or 3.4% of the
time when only considering decisions on the merits. 98 In contrast, after
Toyota Manufacturing, summary judgment dispositions increased to
16.1%, or to 17.9% when considering only dispositions on the merits. 99
Pre-Toyota disability cases were settled 76.5% of the time, or 89.7% of
the time when only considering decisions on the merits.1° In contrast,
after Toyota Manufacturing, settlements fell to 71%, or to 78.6% when
only considering decisions on the merits.' 01
The most striking element in disability dispositions is the dramatic
increase in summary judgment dispositions. The large percentage in-
crease is at least in part explained by the very small ADA summary judg-
ment sample size in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Considering
that there was just one ADA summary judgment disposition in the pre-
Toyota Manufacturing period, compared to five in the post- Toyota Man-
ufacturing period, the real change was the increase of four cases. Addi-
tionally, the post-Toyota ADA dispositions resulted in settlement in 71%
of cases, a number comparable to the 72.9% of settlement outcomes for
race, sex, and age cases combined, perhaps indicating that the post-
Toyota Manufacturing figures demonstrate a normalization of settlement
rates from the especially high rate of 90% before Toyota
Manufacturing. 10 2
Finally, all disability jury verdicts were pro-defendant, leaving eve-
rything decided on the merits a pro-defendant outcome. Despite the
heavy increase in summary judgment dispositions, it is the case that
98 See supra Table 3.2; supra Table 3.3.
99 See supra Table 3.2; supra Table 3.3.
100 See supra Table 3.2; supra Table 3.3.
101 See supra Table 3.2; supra Table 3.3.
102 See supra Table 3; supra Table 3.2.
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78.6% of all cases decided in the period after Toyota were at least par-
tially pro-plaintiff outcomes of settlement. 0 3 It is worth noting that the
pre-Toyota Manufacturing rate of settlement represents cases that were
filed after the definitional scope of the ADA had considerably narrowed,
making it appear that at the time of analysis the Supreme Court decision
had a limited effect on the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 0 4 Con-
versely, it is possible that district courts take two or three years to align
their decision-making with the Court, or simply that all cases heard by
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania were strong enough to avoid sum-
mary judgment dispositions despite the reduced scope of the ADA, al-
though this possibility seems least likely.
Table 4.2: Dispositions of ADA Filings in the Northern District of
Georgia Pre/Post Toyota Manufacturing
Likely Dismissed
Summary Settle- Procedural Non SJ Jury without
Judgment ment Default Dismissed Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
Pre- 7 11 3 2 1 1 3 0 28
Toyota 25% 39.3% 10.7% 7.1% 3.6% 3.6% 10.7% 0% 100%
Post- 5 14 1 1 1 3 1 0 26
Toyota 19.2% 53.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 11.5% 3.8% 0% 100%
Total 12 25 4 3 2 4 4 0 54
22.2% 46.3% 7.4% 5.6% 3.7% 7.4% 7.4% 0% 100%
Table 4.3: Dispositions on the Merits of ADA Filings Pre/Post
Toyota Manufacturing Cases in the Northern District of Georgia
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Pre- 7 11 2 1 0 21
Toyota 33.3% 52.4% 9.5% 4.8% 0% 100%
Post- 5 14 1 1 0 21
Toyota 23.8 % 66.7% 4.8% 4.8% 0% 100%
Total 12 25 3 2 0 42
28.6% 59.5% 7.1% 4.8% 0% 100%
In the Northern District of Georgia, the changes in dispositions on
the merits were noteworthy. ADA summary judgment dispositions de-
creased from 33.3% to 23.8% on the merits.' 0 5 Though this demon-
strates a substantial change in percentage it is important to recognize the
small sample size, and that this change stemmed from a difference in two
real cases Post-Toyota. One of the two jury verdicts in the pre-Toyota
103 See supra Table 3.3 "likely settlements" for ADA cases post-Toyota.
104 Bragdon v. Abbott was decided in 1998 and Sutton v. United Airlines was decided in
1999.
105 See supra Table 4.3.
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Manufacturing period was pro-plaintiff, bringing the pro-plaintiff on the
merits pre-Toyota Manufacturing dispositions to 57.2% (where "likely
settlements" are considered to be pro-plaintiff dispositions), a lower per-
centage of settlements on the merits than the post-Toyota Manufacturing
figure of 66.7%.106
In conclusion, comparing the two districts, total ADA settlements
are more likely in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania where 73.8% of
outcomes after Toyota Manufacturing were settled compared to 46.3% in
the Northern District of Georgia. 107 During the two periods percentages
of ADA settlements increased in Georgia from 39.3% to 53.8% and de-
creased in Pennsylvania from 76.5% to 71%.108
2. Title VII Sex Dispositions in the E.D. of Pennsylvania and
the N.D. of Georgia
Table 3.4: Dispositions of Sex Discrimination Filings in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Pre/Post Toyota Manufacturing
Likely Dismissed
Summary Settle- Procedural Non SJ Jury without
Judgment ment Default Dismissed Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
Pre- 3 38 0 3 3 6 4 0 57
Toyota 5.3% 66.7% 0% 5.3% 5.3% 10.5% 7% 0% 100%
Post- 2 54 1 2 0 4 0 0 63
Toyota 3.2% 85.7% 1.6% 3.2% 0% 6.3% 0% 0% 100%
Total 5 92 1 5 3 10 4 0 120
4.2% 76.7% .83% 4.2% 2.5% 8.3% 3.3% 0% 100%
Table 3.5: Dispositions on the Merits of Sex Discrimination (Title
VII) Filings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Pre/Post
Toyota Manufacturing
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Pre- 3 38 3 3 0 47
Toyota 6.4% 80.9% 6.4% 6.4% 0% 100%
Post- 2 54 2 0 0 58
Toyota 3.4% 93.1% 3.4% 0% 0% 100%
Total 5 92 5 3 0 105
4.8% 87.6% 4.8% 2.9% 0% 100%
Sex discrimination dispositions in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania demonstrated negligible changes in summary judgment disposi-
106 See data lanvers.xls (available upon request); supra Table 4.3.; infra Table 5.2.
107 See supra Table 3.2 and Table 4.2.
108 See supra Table 3.2 and Table 4.2
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tions before and after Toyota Manufacturing. Although the summary
judgment dispositions decreased from 6.4% to 3.4% in sex discrimina-
tion cases disposed of on the merits, the low number of actual summary
judgment dispositions (three in the period before Toyota Manufacturing
and only two in the period after) demonstrates the relative insignificance
of the change.' 0 9 In contrast to disability dispositions, settlements in-
creased in cases filed after Toyota Manufacturing. Of cases disposed of
on the merits, settlements increased from 80.9% to 93.1% after Toyota
Manufacturing. 1 "0 It should be mentioned that three of the cases deter-
mined by jury verdict before Toyota Manufacturing favored plaintiffs. "'
If we add those three cases to the pre- Toyota Manufacturing "likely
settlement" cases to gauge pro-plaintiff dispositions, we find that pro-
plaintiff dispositions on the merits constituted 87.2% before Toyota Man-
ufacturing and 93.1% after Toyota Manufacturing.112 There appears to
be a slight increase in the likelihood of settlement and a decrease in the
number of jury verdicts.
Table 4.4: Dispositions of Sex Discrimination (Title VII) Filings in
the Northern District of Georgia Pre/Post Toyota Manufacturing
Likely Dismissed
Summary Settle- Procedural Non SJ Jury without
Judgment ment Default Dismissed Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
Pre- 20 54 9 4 1 9 6 0 103
Toyota 19.4% 52.4% 8.7% 3.9% .97% 8.7% 5.8% 0% 100%
Post- 22 43 7 6 1 5 9 0 93
Toyota 23.7% 46.2% 7.5% 6.5% 1.1% 5.4% 9.7% 0% 100%
Total 42 97 16 10 2 14 15 0 196
21.4% 49.5% 8.2% 5.1% 1% 7.1% 7.7% 0% 100%
109 See supra Table 3.5
110 See supra Table 3.5.
111 See infra Table 5.2; also lanvers.xls data (available upon request).
112 See supra Table 3.5. To get this figure, I added the three pro-plaintiff jury verdict
dispositions to the 38 "likely settlement" dispositions and divided the sum 41 by the total pre-
Toyota sex discrimination dispositions on the merits.
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Table 4.5: Dispositions on the Merits of Sex Discrimination Pre/
Post Toyota Manufacturing Cases in the Northern District of
Georgia
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Pre- 20 54 4 1 0 79
Toyota 25.3% 68.4% 5.1% 1.3% 0% 100%
Post- 22 43 6 1 0 72
Toyota 30.6% 59.7% 8.3% 1.4% 0% 100%
Total 42 97 10 2 0 151
27.8% 64.2% 6.6% 1.3% 0% 100%
Unlike the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of
Georgia did not demonstrate an increase in settlement. Indeed, the dis-
positions of sex discrimination cases on the merits fell somewhat after
Toyota Manufacturing. In cases decided on the merits, summary judg-
ment dispositions went from 25.3% to 30.6% and settlements from
68.4% to 59.7%.113 Although this represents an increase in summary
judgment dispositions and a decrease in settlement dispositions, these
results were not statistically significant. The increase in summary judg-
ment dispositions to 30.6% brings sex discrimination suits disposed of by
summary judgment to approximately the same proportion of summary
judgment dispositions in race, age, and disability claims in the Northern
District of Georgia. This reinforces the idea that the increase may re-
present stabilization in summary judgment dispositions for sex
discrimination. 114
The major difference between sex discrimination dispositions in
comparing the districts is the greater frequency of settlement in the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania versus the greater frequency of summary
judgment in the Northern District of Georgia. This is exemplified where
settlement differences for sex discrimination plaintiffs account for the
difference of 93.1% settlements on the merits in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and 59.7% settlements on the merits in the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia after Toyota Manufacturing.1 15 Finally, the differences
for summary judgment dispositions after Toyota Manufacturing account
113 See supra Table 4.5.
114 See supra Table 4.5. In the Northern District of Georgia post-Toyota Manufacturing
period the proportion of summary judgment on the merits were: 23.8% for ADA claims,
30.6% for sex claims, 30.7% for race claims, and 33.3% for ADEA claims. See supra Table
4.3; supra Table 4.5; infra Table 4.7; infra Table 4.9. Interestingly ADA claims demonstrate a
downward shift from 33.3% to 23.8%, however, given the relatively small sample size, it is
reasonable to argue that in the Northern District of Georgia summary judgment dispositions in
employment discrimination cases result in about 30% of possible outcomes.
115 See supra Table 3.5; supra Table 4.5.
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for 3.4% of outcomes in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and 30.6%
in outcomes in the Northern District of Georgia. 1 6
3. Title VII Race Dispositions in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania
Table 3.6: Dispositions of Race Discrimination (Title VII) Filings
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Pre/Post Filings Pre/Post
Toyota Manufacturing
Likely Dismissed
Summary Settle- Procedural Non SJ Jury without
Judgment ment Default Dismissed Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
Pre- 8 35 2 2 0 2 3 0 52
Toyota 15.4% 67.3% 3.8% 3.8% 0% 3.8% 5.8% 0% 100%
Post- 3 41 1 2 3 5 3 1 59
Toyota 5% 69.5% 1.7% 3.4% 5% 8.5% 5% 1.7% 100%
Total 11 76 3 4 3 7 6 1 111
9.9% 68.5% 2.7% 3.6% 2.7% 6.3% 5.4% .90% 100%
Table 3.7: Dispositions on the Merits of Race Discrimination (Title
VII) Filings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Pre/Post
Toyota Manufacturing
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Pre- 8 35 2 0 0 45
Toyota 17.8% 77.8% 4.4% 0% 0% 100%
Post- 3 41 2 3 1 50
Toyota 6% 82% 4% 6% 2% 100%
Total 11 76 4 3 1 95
11.6% 80% 4.2% 3.2% 1.1% 100%
Similar to sex discrimination dispositions in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, race dispositions post-Toyota Manufacturing remained rel-
atively consistent with pre-Toyota Manufacturing dispositions. Race dis-
positions demonstrated a decrease in summary judgment dispositions,
from 17.8% to 6%.117 Although summary judgment dispositions de-
creased by a dramatic percentage, the very small number of summary
judgment dispositions in the before and after pool make determinations
of decreases in the use of summary judgment difficult to accurately es-
tablish, and the results are not statistically significant. Furthermore, dur-
ing this period, there were two pro-defendant jury verdicts and one pro-
116 See supra Table 3.5; supra Table 4.5.
117 See supra Table 3.7.
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defendant bench decision. "18 When all pro-defendant dispositions on the
merits are considered, the difference between pre-Toyota Manufacturing
and post-Toyota Manufacturing figures is not as dramatic as the differ-
ence in summary judgment appears. In the pre-Toyota Manufacturing
period, 24.2% resulted in pro-defendant dispositions whereas in the post-
Toyota Manufacturing period, 14%1 19  resulted in pro-defendant
dispositions. 120
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania demonstrated a slight increase
in settlements. Of decisions on the merits, likely settlement dispositions
went from 77.8% to 82%.121 Jury verdicts consisted of one pro-defen-
dant outcome pre-Toyota Manufacturing and two pro-defendant and one
pro-plaintiff outcome post-Toyota Manufacturing. When combined with
likely settlements, the pro-plaintiff jury verdict adds some weight to pro-
plaintiff outcomes in the post-Toyota Manufacturing stage resulting in
84% pro-plaintiff dispositions. 122 While there appears to be an increase
in the likelihood of settlement, the results in the post-Toyota Manufactur-
ing period are reasonably consistent with figures from the pre-Toyota
Manufacturing period.
Table 4.6: Dispositions of Race Discrimination (Title VII) Filings
in the Northern District of Georgia Pre/Post Toyota
Manufacturing
Likely Dismissed
Summary Settle- Procedural Non SJ Jury without
Judgment ment Default Dismissed Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
Pre- 33 44 12 8 1 7 1 1 107
Toyota 30.8% 41.1% 11.2% 7.5% .93% 6.5% .93% .93% 100%
Post- 27 50 15 10 1 4 7 0 114
Toyota 23.7% 43.9% 13.2% 8.8% .88% 3.5% 6.1% 0% 100%
Total 60 94 27 18 2 11 8 1 221
27.1% 42.5% 12.2% 8.1% .9% 5% 3.6% .45% 100%
118 See infra Table 5.2.
119 See supra Table 3.7 where two jury verdicts resulted in pro-defendant outcomes, two
cases were dismissed on the merits (presumed to be in favor of the defendant), three cases
resulted in summary judgment dispositions, and the bench decision was decided in favor of the
employer, resulting in 7/50 or 14% determined in favor of the employer. This consists of all
dispositions that were not settled or that did not result in a pro-plaintiff jury verdict.
120 See supra Table. 3.7, pro-defendant outcomes were determined in part by jury verdict
outcomes available infra Table 5.2, and by adding to summary judgment disposition non sum-
mary judgment dismissals on the merits.
121 See supra Table 3.7.
122 See supra Table 3.7 where there were 41 settlements on the merits post-Toyota, to this
add I pro-plaintiff jury verdict, see infra Table 5.2 and the result is 42/50 or 84%.
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Table 4.7: Dispositions on the Merits of Race Discrimination Pre/
Post Toyota Manufacturing Cases in the Northern District of
Georgia
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Pre- 33 44 8 1 1 87
Toyota 37.9% 50.6% 9.2% 1.1% 1.1% 100%
Post- 27 50 10 1 0 88
Toyota 30.7 % 56.8% 11.4% 1.1% 0% 100%
Total 60 94 18 2 1 175
34.3% 53.7% 10.3% 1.1% .57% 100%
Similarly, the Northern District of Georgia demonstrated relative
stability before and after Toyota Manufacturing. Cases decided on the
merits resulted in summary judgment dispositions 37.9% of the time
before the decision, and 30.7% of the time after the decision. 123 Cases
decided on the merits that resulted in settlements consisted of 50.6% of
all pre-Toyota Manufacturing cases and 56.8% of all post Toyota Manu-
facturing cases.' 24 Finally, the two jury verdicts resulted in pro-plaintiff
dispositions, and the bench decision resulted in a pro-defendant out-
come. 125 This reveals a slight net increase in pro-plaintiff dispositions
when considered with likely settlements, creating an increase from
51.7% to 57.9%.126
Like the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of
Georgia demonstrated an increase in the use of settlement dispositions
and a decrease in the use of summary judgment dispositions. However,
consistent with disability and sex dispositions described in the Northern
District of Georgia above, race discrimination dispositions showed a sim-
ilar proportion to other uses of summary judgment and settlement dispo-
sitions in Georgia, 30.7% summary judgment and 56.8% settlement in
the post Toyota Manufacturing period. 127
123 See supra Table 4.7.
124 See supra Table 4.7.
125 See infra Table 5.2.
126 See supra Table 4.7; infra Table 5.2., add one pro-plaintiff disposition to pre and post
Toyota likely settlement on the merit and get 45/87 and 51/88 or 51.7% and 57.9%
respectively.
127 See supra Table 4.7; supra Table 4.5; supra Table 4.3.
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4. ADEA Age Dispositions in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania
Table 3.8: Dispositions of Age Discrimination (ADEA) Filings in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Pre/Post Toyota
Manufacturing Cases
Likely Dismissed
Summary Settle- Procedural Non SJ Jury without
Judgment ment Default Dismissed Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
Pre- 2 22 0 0 4 1 1 0 30
Toyota 6.7% 73.3% 0% 0% 13.3% 3.3% 3.3% 0% 100%
Post- 5 30 0 2 0 3 1 0 41
Toyota 12.2% 73.2% 0% 4.9% 0% 7.3% 2.4% 0% 100%
Total 7 52 0 2 4 4 2 0 71
9.9% 73.2% 0% 2.8% 5.6% 5.6% 2.8% 0% 100%
Table 3.9: Dispositions on the Merits of Age Discrimination
(ADEA) Filings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Pre/Post
Toyota Manufacturing
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Pre- 2 22 0 4 0 28
Toyota 7.1% 78.6% 0% 14.3% 0% 100%
Post- 5 30 2 0 0 37
Toyota 13.5% 81.1% 5.4% 0% 0% 100%
Total 7 52 2 4 0 65
10.8% 80% 3.1% 6.2% 0% 100%
Age discrimination suits in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
demonstrated no change in summary judgment dispositions and a slight
increase in likely settlement. When considered on the merits, age sum-
mary judgment dispositions increased from 7.1% to 13.5% and likely
settlement increased from 78.6% to 81.1%.128 The change in pro-plain-
tiff disposition may appear to be greater than it is as two of the pre-
Toyota Manufacturing jury verdicts favored plaintiffs. A more accurate
demonstration of pro-plaintiff outcomes would include the two pro-plain-
tiff jury verdicts in the pre-Toyota Manufacturing period. This means
that 85.7% of the pre-Toyota Manufacturing cases resulted in a pro-
plaintiff disposition, if settlements are considered to be pro-plaintiff.129
128 See supra Table 3.9.
129 See supra Table 3.9; infra Table 5.2, by adding two pro-plaintiff jury verdicts to 22
likely settlement outcomes on the merits and divided by all cases determined on the merits,
resulting in 24/28 or 85.7%
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Therefore, age discrimination cases have remained largely stable, with a
slight increase in settlements.
Table 4.8: Dispositions of Age Discrimination (ADEA) Filings Pre/
Post Toyota Manufacturing in the Northern District of Georgia
Likely Dismissed
Summary Settle- Procedural Non SJ Jury without
Judgment ment Default Dismissed Verdict Misc. prejudice Bench Total
Pre- 6 12 2 0 1 1 2 0 24
Toyota 25% 50% 8.3% 0% 4.2% 4.2% 8.3% 0% 100%
Post- 6 11 3 1 0 1 2 0 24
Toyota 25% 45.8% 12.5% 4.2% 0% 4.2% 8.3% 0% 100%
Total 12 23 5 1 1 2 4 0 48
25% 48% 10.4% 2.1% 2.1% 4.2% 8.3% 0% 100%
Table 4.9: Dispositions on the Merits of Age Discrimination
(ADEA) Pre/Post Toyota Manufacturing Cases in the Northern
District of Georgia
Summary Likely Non SJ Jury
Judgment Settlement Dismissed Verdict Bench Total
Pre- 6 12 0 1 0 19
Toyota 31.6% 63.2% 0% 5.3% 0% 100%
Post- 6 11 1 0 0 18
Toyota 33.3% 61.1% 5.6% 0% 0% 100%
Total 12 23 1 1 0 37
32.4% 62.2% 2.7% 2.7% 0% 100%
As was the case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, age disposi-
tions in the Northern District of Georgia demonstrated negligible
changes in the periods analyzed. Age dispositions demonstrated a slight
increase in summary judgment dispositions and a slight decrease in like-
lihood of settlement. Summary judgments, increased from 31.6% to
33.3% and likely settlements decreased from 63.2% to 61.1% of disposi-
tions on the merits. 130 Finally, the lone jury verdict resulted in a pro-
defendant disposition, maintaining the likelihood of a pro-plaintiff dispo-
sition before and after Toyota Manufacturing at 63.2% and 61.1%,
respectively. 13 1
130 See supra Table 4.9.
131 See supra Table 4.9.
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5. Jury Verdicts in the E.D. of Pennsylvania and the N.D.
of Georgia
Table 5.1: Jury Verdict Dispositions in the Northern District of
Georgia and in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Verdict Favors Verdict Favors
Defendant Plaintiff Total
Northern District 5 2 7
of Georgia 71.4% 28.6% 100%
Eastern District of 7 6 13
Pennsylvania 54% 46% 100%
Total 12 8 20
60% 40% 100%
Finally, jury verdicts were twice as frequent in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania than in the Northern District of Georgia. In the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania pro-defendant outcomes accounted for 54% of
verdicts, and pro-plaintiff outcomes accounted for 46% of verdicts. 132 In
the Northern District of Georgia pro-defendant outcomes accounted for
71.4% of verdicts, and pro-plaintiff outcomes accounted for 28.6% of
verdicts. 133 Although these outcomes favor defendants, they are hardly a
complete loss to plaintiffs. 134
Table 5.2: Jury Verdict Dispositions by type of discrimination in
the Northern District of Georgia and in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania 135
Race Age Sex ADA Total
P victory in 1 0 0 1 2
NDGA 50% 0% 0% 50% 100%
P victory in 1 2 3 0 6
EDPA 16.7% 33.3% 50% 0% 100%
D victory in 2 2 0 3 7
EDPA 28.5% 28.5% 0% 42.9% 100%
D victory in 1 1 2 1 5
NDGA 20% 20% 40% 20% 100%
Total 5 5 5 5 20
25% 25% 25% 25% 100%
The types of discrimination cases that fared best in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania (age and sex) fared worst in Northern District of
132 See supra Table 5.1.
133 See supra Table 5.1.
134 See supra Table 5.1.
135 See lanvers.xls (available upon request).
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Georgia, and the cases that fared best in the Northern District of Georgia
(disability and race) fared worst in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
These figures are of limited use, as there are so few. Further, jury ver-
dicts represent a unique form of disposition insofar as they probably re-
flect a more tedious assessment of facts and the relative merits of the
given case. Finally, although jury verdicts are naturally of interest, they
account for a minimal percentage of all dispositions.1 36 No assessment
of how anti-discrimination laws affect employees in practice is complete
if it merely involves the analysis of jury verdicts or bench decisions,
where 97.5% of cases are disposed of on and off the merits without a
jury verdict or bench decision.1 37
Table 5.3: Jury Verdict and Bench Outcomes compared to all
other Dispositions in Race, Sex, Disability, and Age
Discrimination Cases in the Northern District of Georgia and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Other Dispositions
Other Dispositions Dismissed without
Jury Verdict Bench Verdict on the Merits Prejudice Total
20 2 704 160 886
2.3% .23% 79.5% 18% 100%
VI. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
In conclusion, although Toyota Manufacturing does not demonstrate
a significant effect on the outcomes of dispositions, these dispositions
provide insight into differences in district court dispositions and trends in
those dispositions. Both districts demonstrated general consistency
across categories of discrimination. Both also demonstrated slight differ-
ences in respective increasing tendency towards either summary judg-
ment or settlement. Ultimately it appears that the ADA fares better than
its critics allege, and that the variance between district courts contributes
to a good degree of variation in employment discrimination case
outcomes.
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania demonstrates a general in-
crease in settlement dispositions, with the exception of disability claims.
Indeed, when considering cases on the merits, disability settlement dis-
positions decreased from 89.7% to 78.6% of ADA dispositions, com-
pared to sex settlement dispositions on the merits that increased from
80.9% to 93.1% of Title VII dispositions, age settlement dispositions on
the merits that increased from 77.8% to 82% of ADEA dispositions, and
136 See infra Table 5.3.
137 See infra Table 5.3.
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race dispositions on the merits that went from 78.6% to 81.1%.1 38 This
may be attributable to courts' response to the Supreme Court's narrowed
definition of disability. However, it is also worth reflecting on the fact
that in the years prior to Toyota Manufacturing, disability dispositions
settled at nearly a rate of 90% when considered on the merits, compared
to 77.8%, 78.6%, and 80.9% of age, race, and sex, respectively. 139 So it
might be the case that ADA settlement rates were abnormally high and
the resulting decrease reflects a normalization of settlement rates rather
than a drastic decrease because of ADA definition narrowing and media
attacks. Thus, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania post-Toyota, set-
tlement dispositions ranged from 78.6% to 93.1% of all cases decided on
the merits.
Summary judgment disposition in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania demonstrated some fluctuations but also maintained a stable
range. Disability summary judgment dispositions on the merits increased
from 3.4% to 17.9%, compared to sex summary judgment dispositions
on the merits which decreased from 6.4% to 3.4%, race summary judg-
ment dispositions on the merits decreased from 17.8% to 6%, and age
summary judgment dispositions increased from 7.1% to 13.5%.14o This
reflected a range of summary judgment dispositions pre-and post-Toyota
Manufacturing between 3.4% and 17.9%.
The Northern District of Georgia was slightly more consistent
across categories than the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Outcomes
post Toyota Manufacturing resulted in fewer settlement dispositions and
more frequent summary judgment dispositions in most categories of
cases determined on the merits. Summary judgment remained largely
stable with slight increases in sex and age discrimination cases disposed
of on the merits, and greater decreases in race and disability summary
judgment dispositions decided on the merits. Disability dispositions de-
creased from 33.3% to 23.8%, sex dispositions increased from 25.3% to
30.6%, race dispositions decreased from 37.9% to 30.7%, and age dispo-
sitions increased from 31.6% to 33.3%.141 The decrease in race and disa-
bility dispositions seems to reflect a general trend of summary judgment
dispositions resulting in approximately 30% of dispositions on the merits
in the Northern District of Georgia. The resulting range of summary
judgment dispositions in the pre and post-Toyota decision in the North-
ern District of Georgia was between 23.8% and 37.9%.
However, consistent with the Northern District of Georgia's de-
crease in summary judgment dispositions in race and disability, was an
138 See supra Table 3.3; supra Table 3.5; supra Table 3.7; supra Table 3.9.
139 See supra Table 3.3; supra Table 3.5; supra Table 3.7; supra Table 3.9.
140 See supra Table 3.3; supra Table 3.5; supra Table 3.7; supra Table 3.9.
141 See supra Table 4.3; supra Table 4.5; supra Table 4.7; supra Table 4.9.
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increase in disability and race settlement dispositions. In the Northern
District of Georgia, disability settlement dispositions increased from
52.4% to 66.7%, sex settlement dispositions decreased from 68.4% to
59.7%, race settlement dispositions increased from 50.6% to 56.8%, and
age settlement dispositions decreased from 63.2% to 61.1%.142 This re-
flects a range of settlement between 50.6% and 68.4%.
In settlement comparison between the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania and the Northern District of Georgia pre and post-Toyota, settle-
ment dispositions resulted in a range between 78.6% to 93.1% 14 3 and
50.6% and 68.4%144, respectively, of all cases decided on the merits. In
summary judgment comparison between the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania and the Northern District of Georgia pre and post-Toyota, sum-
mary judgment dispositions resulted in a range between 3.4% and
17.9%14 5,and 23.8% and 37.9%146, respectively, of all cases decided on
the merits.
This lends support to the idea that the merits of the actual case may
not be as significant as the district court's leanings towards use of partic-
ular dispositions. In the Northern District of Georgia this may be ex-
plained by what some allege is an increased use of summary judgment
dispositions in federal civil litigation.147 It has been shown, for example,
that summary judgment dispositions have risen substantially from 1960
to 2000, with one conservative range estimating that they have increased
from 1.8% to 7.7% in particular districts.148 Furthermore, the same re-
search has demonstrated that these summary judgment outcomes vary,
"sometimes dramatically" among courts and different types of cases. 149
Another notable aspect of this is the pro-defendant dispositions of all
summary judgment outcomes I reviewed. Previous studies have sug-
gested that 38.7% of trial court cases that were not appealed were re-
solved through summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer,
while only 1% were resolved through summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. 150
142 See supra Table 4.3; supra Table 4.5; supra Table 4.7; supra Table 4.9.
143 See supra Table 3.3; supra Table 3.5; supra Table 3.7; supra Table 3.9.
144 See supra Table 4.3; supra Table 4.5; supra Table 4.7; supra Table 4.9.
145 See supra Table 3.3; supra Table 3.5; supra Table 3.7; supra Table 3.9.
146 See supra Table 4.3; supra Table 4.5; supra Table 4.7; supra Table 4.9.
147 These findings are consistent with recent work studying the increasing use of sum-
mary judgment dispositions in federal civil litigation. See, e.g. Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing
Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomor-
rah? 1(3) J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591 (Nov. 2004).
148 Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah? 1(3) J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 591 (Nov.
2004).
149 Id.
150 See Colker, supra note 7, at 126.
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Another possibility is that cases in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania are stronger, or are better able to avoid pro-defendant summary
judgment. This seems unlikely, especially considering the consistency in
proportion of type of disposition within each district despite the substan-
tially different burdens of proof required under Title VII, ADA, and
ADEA. Title VII race and sex claims allow the use of circumstantial
evidence in establishing a prima facie case and give plaintiffs the oppor-
tunity to refute the employer's affirmative defense by demonstrating pre-
text, a lower burden of proof than that required for ADEA or ADA cases.
Age discrimination plaintiffs effectively have to present direct evidence
of animus against employees on the basis of age, such that indirect evi-
dence such as statements regarding the costs of financing older employ-
ees' pensions are not sufficient to establish age discrimination.' 5 1
Finally ADA employees have the burden of showing that mitigating
measures do not reduce their disabilities, that they can perform the essen-
tial job function if provided a reasonable accommodation, and that this
reasonable accommodation does not provide an undue burden on the em-
ployer.' 52 This gives an employer multiple affirmative defenses, where
the employer can demonstrate that the plaintiff could not do the work
even with a reasonable accommodation, or that the accommodation
presented an undue burden on the employer. 153 Given both the different
burdens established by the separate statutes and the considerable con-
straints of these burdens it appears that trial court dispositions may be
more a function of the characteristics of the given federal court and its
tendency to dispose of cases in the form of settlement or summary judg-
ment, than it reflects the quality of cases brought to each district.
VII. LIMITATIONS
The study presented has its limitations. As noted above, the lack of
symmetry in the cases before and after Toyota Manufacturing may be
problematic. It would also be prudent to use a control group where ADA
case outcomes are compared to all federal civil litigation employment
outcomes, or all civil litigation outcomes in each district studied. Fi-
nally, studies that attempt to determine the effects of Supreme Court de-
cisions on plaintiff behavior and plaintiff outcomes are inherently limited
because any change in frequency of cases or case outcomes may be the
result of any number of undetermined and undeterminable factors includ-
151 See Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-614 (1993).
152 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Sutton v. United Airlines 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (re-
stricting definition of visually disabled to include only people who remain visually impaired
after employing a "mitigating measure" such as glasses or contacts).
153 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101
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ing changed plaintiff behavior, changed attorney behavior, or increased
or decreased likelihood of pre-trial settlement.
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrates that disability discrimination cases fare
comparably to race, sex, and age discrimination cases, that location may
matter more than cause of action, and that settlements, although not per-
fect pro-plaintiff outcomes, are dispositions that cannot be dismissed cat-
egorically as pro-defendant outcomes. This poses deeper questions about
how we assess civil rights laws. Can we accurately say that these laws
are failing intended beneficiaries simply because jury verdicts and bench
decisions, which represent less than 2.5%154 of all cases decided on the
merits, tend to be decided in favor of defendants? It seems that the anal-
ysis is focused at the tip of the iceberg, not where the majority of the
action on the merits occurs. In addition to representing an inaccurate
measure of defendant success, the scholarly focus on pro-defendant out-
comes of bench trials and jury verdicts may have the effect of discourag-
ing plaintiffs and plaintiff-side employment discrimination lawyers from
taking potential cases.
The emphasis on jury verdicts and bench decisions further detracts
from the goals of civil rights legislation. While a central goal of employ-
ment discrimination legislation is to give employees in protected catego-
ries a channel of recourse for discrimination, the intended purpose of
these statutes is to change employer behavior and encourage compliance
with anti-discrimination policies.
The EEOC was founded to foster a spirit of settlement for persons
in protected categories of employment discrimination. 155 The use of the
EEOC as a pre-litigation settlement administrator tends to emphasize the
goals of compliance through alternative dispute resolution. Along these
lines, the ADA was one of the first statutes to explicitly encourage the
use of mediation for dispute resolution. 156 To measure the success of a
statute by an outcome not central to, or even encouraged by, the statute
itself seems to fail the purpose of the statute. What is more, the preva-
lence of EEOC settlements and pre-trial settlements tends to demonstrate
that employment discrimination laws are anything but inactive, ineffec-
tive formalities. It runs counter to the spirit of civil rights laws that we
154 See supra Table 5.3
155 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). Indeed, the ADA has a specific provision encouraging the
use of mediation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2006) ("Where appropriate and to the extent author-
ized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution including settlement negotia-
tions, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact finding, mini-trials, and arbitration, is
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter.").
156 See 42 U.S.C § 12212.
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opt to solely measure their success on the basis of outcomes of cases that
are determined in a bench or jury verdict. The emphasis on bench and
jury decisions goes beyond obscuring the actual nature of outcomes; it
runs contrary to the goals of these particular laws, and it may have the
adverse effect of discouraging individuals and groups facing discrimina-
tion from filing claims of discrimination.
Although an assessment of jury verdicts and bench trials is useful,
the method of analysis should change to reflect a more comprehensive
view of civil litigation dispositions. The method of analysis should also
reflect the particular goals of the statute. In the case of employment dis-
crimination, the goal seems to be to effect employer change through set-
tlement, not through litigation.
Finally, this paper poses questions about the effects of narrowing
legal definitions on dispositions. Conceding that this analysis reflected
only two locations, Atlanta and Philadelphia, it appears that a local pref-
erence for summary judgment may affect settlement outcomes more than
the effects of narrowing legal definitions. The ADA has been consist-
ently narrowed since 1998, yet these changes are not reflected in a dra-
matic increase in defendant summary judgment dispositions in the years
after the narrowing began. There was, however, remarkable consistency
in each location's frequency of settlement and defendant summary judg-
ment dispositions.
